Saks, M. J. & Koehler, J. J. (1991). What DNA "Fingerprinting" Can Teach the Law About the Rest of Forensic Science. Cardozo Law Review. 13, 361-372.

ABSTRACT

The attention and scrutiny DNA fingerprinting evidence is receiving should be welcomed and encouraged. However this attention should not obscure the fact that most other forensic sciences have escaped similar scrutiny. Nor should it obscure the fact that most forensic sciences, including DNA fingerprinting, rely on assumptions that have not yet been verified by careful empirical testing.

It is our hope that the scrutiny of DNA fingerprinting evidence will continue and that this process will serve as a model for other forensic sciences. Of course, the initial cost of examining the basic assumptions and standard operating procedures of our forensic sciences may be great in terms of time and effort expended. But the hidden costs of making erroneous assumptions and using faulty procedures where lives are at stake are greater.

As scientists, forensic experts should welcome this call for careful scrutiny of their procedures. The scientific attitude is one of testing, discussion and a willingness to revise claims in the face of new data. At present, the forensic sciences offer little in the way of hard data to support their central, empirical claims. This is unacceptable, particularly in light of the influence forensic science testimony is likely to have on factfinders at trial. Instead, forensic scientists in all areas should subject their claims to methodologically rigorous proficiency tests. The results of these tests should be published and debated. Until such steps are taken, the strong claims of forensic scientists should be regarded with caution.

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