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September 7, 2003

The Futile Pursuit of Happiness

By JON=20 GERTNER

If Daniel Gilbert is right, then you are wrong. That is to say, if = Daniel=20 Gilbert is right, then you are wrong to believe that a new car will make = you as=20 happy as you imagine. You are wrong to believe that a new kitchen will = make you=20 happy for as long as you imagine. You are wrong to think that you will = be more=20 unhappy with a big single setback (a broken wrist, a broken heart) than = with a=20 lesser chronic one (a trick knee, a tense marriage). You are wrong to = assume=20 that job failure will be crushing. You are wrong to expect that a death = in the=20 family will leave you bereft for year upon year, forever and ever. You = are even=20 wrong to reckon that a cheeseburger you order in a restaurant -- this = week, next=20 week, a year from now, it doesn't really matter when -- will definitely = hit the=20 spot. That's because when it comes to predicting exactly how you will = feel in=20 the future, you are most likely wrong.

A professor in Harvard's department of psychology, Gilbert likes to = tell=20 people that he studies happiness. But it would be more precise to say = that=20 Gilbert -- along with the psychologist Tim Wilson of the University of = Virginia,=20 the economist George Loewenstein of Carnegie-Mellon and the psychologist = (and=20 Nobel laureate in economics) Daniel Kahneman of Princeton -- has taken = the lead=20 in studying a specific type of emotional and behavioral prediction. In = the past=20 few years, these four men have begun to question the decision-making = process=20 that shapes our sense of well-being: how do we predict what will make us = happy=20 or unhappy -- and then how do we feel after the actual experience? For = example,=20 how do we suppose we'll feel if our favorite college football team wins = or=20 loses, and then how do we really feel a few days after the game? How do = we=20 predict we'll feel about purchasing jewelry, having children, buying a = big house=20 or being rich? And then how do we regard the outcomes? According to this = small=20 corps of academics, almost all actions -- the decision to buy jewelry, = have=20 kids, buy the big house or work exhaustively for a fatter paycheck -- = are based=20 on our predictions of the emotional consequences of these events.

Until recently, this was uncharted territory. How we forecast our = feelings,=20 and whether those predictions match our future emotional states, had = never been=20 the stuff of laboratory research. But in scores of experiments, Gilbert, = Wilson,=20 Kahneman and Loewenstein have made a slew of observations and = conclusions that=20 undermine a number of fundamental assumptions: namely, that we humans = understand=20 what we want and are adept at improving our well-being -- that we are = good at=20 maximizing our utility, in the jargon of traditional economics. Further, = their=20 work on prediction raises some unsettling and somewhat more personal = questions.=20 To understand affective forecasting, as Gilbert has termed these = studies, is to=20 wonder if everything you have ever thought about life choices, and about = happiness, has been at the least somewhat naive and, at worst, greatly = mistaken.=20

The problem, as Gilbert and company have come to discover, is that we = falter=20 when it comes to imagining how we will feel about something in the = future. It=20 isn't that we get the big things wrong. We know we will experience = visits to Le=20 Cirque and to the periodontist differently; we can accurately predict = that we'd=20 rather be stuck in Montauk than in a Midtown elevator. What Gilbert has = found,=20 however, is that we overestimate the intensity and the duration of our = emotional=20 reactions -- our ''affect'' -- to future events. In other words, we = might=20 believe that a new BMW will make life perfect. But it will almost = certainly be=20 less exciting than we anticipated; nor will it excite us for as long as=20 predicted. The vast majority of Gilbert's test participants through the = years=20 have consistently made just these sorts of errors both in the laboratory = and in=20 real-life situations. And whether Gilbert's subjects were trying to = predict how=20 they would feel in the future about a plate of spaghetti with meat = sauce, the=20 defeat of a preferred political candidate or romantic rejection seemed = not to=20 matter. On average, bad events proved less intense and more transient = than test=20 participants predicted. Good events proved less intense and briefer as = well.=20

Gilbert and his collaborator Tim Wilson call the gap between what we = predict=20 and what we ultimately experience the ''impact bias'' -- ''impact'' = meaning the=20 errors we make in estimating both the intensity and duration of our = emotions and=20 ''bias'' our tendency to err. The phrase characterizes how we experience = the=20 dimming excitement over not just a BMW but also over any object or event = that we=20 presume will make us happy. Would a 20 percent raise or winning the = lottery=20 result in a contented life? You may predict it will, but almost surely = it won't=20 turn out that way. And a new plasma television? You may have high hopes, = but the=20 impact bias suggests that it will almost certainly be less cool, and in = a=20 shorter time, than you imagine. Worse, Gilbert has noted that these = mistakes of=20 expectation can lead directly to mistakes in choosing what we think will = give us=20 pleasure. He calls this ''miswanting.''

''The average person says, 'I know I'll be happier with a Porsche=20 than a Chevy,' '' Gilbert explains. '' 'Or with Linda rather than = Rosalyn. Or as=20 a doctor rather than as a plumber.' That seems very clear to people. The = problem=20 is, I can't get into medical school or afford the Porsche. So for the = average=20 person, the obstacle between them and happiness is actually getting the = futures=20 that they desire. But what our research shows -- not just ours, but=20 Loewenstein's and Kahneman's -- is that the real problem is figuring out = which=20 of those futures is going to have the high payoff and is really going to = make=20 you happy.

''You know, the Stones said, 'You can't always get what you want,' '' = Gilbert=20 adds. ''I don't think that's the problem. The problem is you can't = always know=20 what you want.''


Gilbert's papers on affective forecasting began to appear in the = late=20 1990's, but the idea to study happiness and emotional prediction = actually came=20 to him on a sunny afternoon in October 1992, just as he and his friend = Jonathan=20 Jay Koehler sat down for lunch outside the psychology building at the = University=20 of Texas at Austin, where both men were teaching at the time. Gilbert = was=20 uninspired about his studies and says he felt despair about his failing=20 marriage. And as he launched into a discussion of his personal life, he = swerved=20 to ask why economists focus on the financial aspects of decision making = rather=20 than the emotional ones. Koehler recalls, ''Gilbert said something like: = 'It all=20 seems so small. It isn't really about money; it's about happiness. Isn't = that=20 what everybody wants to know when we make a decision?' '' For a moment, = Gilbert=20 forgot his troubles, and two more questions came to him. Do we even know = what=20 makes us happy? And if it's difficult to figure out what makes us happy = in the=20 moment, how can we predict what will make us happy in the future?

In the early 1990's, for an up-and-coming psychology professor like = Gilbert=20 to switch his field of inquiry from how we perceive one another to = happiness, as=20 he did that day, was just a hairsbreadth short of bizarre. But Gilbert = has=20 always liked questions that lead him somewhere new. Now 45, Gilbert = dropped out=20 of high school at 15, hooking into what he calls ''the tail end of the = hippie=20 movement'' and hitchhiking aimlessly from town to town with his guitar. = He met=20 his wife on the road; she was hitching in the other direction. They = married at=20 17, had a son at 18 and settled down in Denver. ''I pulled weeds, I sold = rebar,=20 I sold carpet, I installed carpet, I spent a lot of time as a phone = solicitor,''=20 he recalls. During this period he spent several years turning out=20 science-fiction stories for magazines like Amazing Stories. Thus, in = addition to=20 being ''one of the most gifted social psychologists of our age,'' as the = psychology writer and professor David G. Myers describes him to me, = Gilbert is=20 the author of ''The Essence of Grunk,'' a story about an encounter with = a=20 creature made of egg salad that jets around the galaxy in a = rocket-powered=20 refrigerator.

Psychology was a matter of happenstance. In the midst of his sci-fi = career,=20 Gilbert tried to sign up for a writing course at the local community = college,=20 but the class was full; he figured that psych, still accepting = registrants,=20 would help him with character development in his fiction. It led instead = to an=20 undergraduate degree at the University of Colorado at Denver, then a = Ph.D. at=20 Princeton, then an appointment at the University of Texas, then the = appointment=20 at Harvard. ''People ask why I study happiness,'' Gilbert says, ''and I = say,=20 'Why study anything else?' It's the holy grail. We're studying the thing = that=20 all human action is directed toward.''

One experiment of Gilbert's had students in a photography class at = Harvard=20 choose two favorite pictures from among those they had just taken and = then=20 relinquish one to the teacher. Some students were told their choices = were=20 permanent; others were told they could exchange their prints after = several days.=20 As it turned out, those who had time to change their minds were less = pleased=20 with their decisions than those whose choices were irrevocable.

Much of Gilbert's research is in this vein. Another recent study = asked=20 whether transit riders in Boston who narrowly missed their trains = experienced=20 the self-blame that people tend to predict they'll feel in this = situation. (They=20 did not.) And a paper waiting to be published, ''The Peculiar Longevity = of=20 Things Not So Bad,'' examines why we expect that bigger problems will = always=20 dwarf minor annoyances. ''When really bad things happen to us, we defend = against=20 them,'' Gilbert explains. ''People, of course, predict the exact = opposite. If=20 you ask, 'What would you rather have, a broken leg or a trick knee?' = they'd=20 probably say, 'Trick knee.' And yet, if your goal is to accumulate = maximum=20 happiness over your lifetime, you just made the wrong choice. A trick = knee is a=20 bad thing to have.''

All of these studies establish the links between prediction, decision = making=20 and well-being. The photography experiment challenges our common = assumption that=20 we would be happier with the option to change our minds when in fact = we're=20 happier with closure. The transit experiment demonstrates that we tend = to err in=20 estimating our regret over missed opportunities. The ''things not so = bad'' work=20 shows our failure to imagine how grievously irritations compromise our=20 satisfaction. Our emotional defenses snap into action when it comes to a = divorce=20 or a disease but not for lesser problems. We fix the leaky roof on our = house,=20 but over the long haul, the broken screen door we never mend adds up to = more=20 frustration.

Gilbert does not believe all forecasting mistakes lead to similar = results; a=20 death in the family, a new gym membership and a new husband are not the = same,=20 but in how they affect our well-being they are similar. ''Our research = simply=20 says that whether it's the thing that matters or the thing that doesn't, = both of=20 them matter less than you think they will,'' he says. ''Things that = happen to=20 you or that you buy or own -- as much as you think they make a = difference to=20 your happiness, you're wrong by a certain amount. You're overestimating = how much=20 of a difference they make. None of them make the difference you think. = And=20 that's true of positive and negative events.''

3DMuch of=20 the work of Kahneman, Loewenstein, Gilbert and Wilson takes its cue from = the=20 concept of adaptation, a term psychologists have used since at least the = 1950's=20 to refer to how we acclimate to changing circumstances. George = Loewenstein sums=20 up this human capacity as follows: ''Happiness is a signal that our = brains use=20 to motivate us to do certain things. And in the same way that our eye = adapts to=20 different levels of illumination, we're designed to kind of go back to = the=20 happiness set point. Our brains are not trying to be happy. Our brains = are=20 trying to regulate us.'' In this respect, the tendency toward adaptation = suggests why the impact bias is so pervasive. As Tim Wilson says: ''We = don't=20 realize how quickly we will adapt to a pleasurable event and make it the = backdrop of our lives. When any event occurs to us, we make it ordinary. = And=20 through becoming ordinary, we lose our pleasure.''

It is easy to overlook something new and crucial in what Wilson is = saying.=20 Not that we invariably lose interest in bright and shiny things over = time --=20 this is a long-known trait -- but that we're generally unable to = recognize that=20 we adapt to new circumstances and therefore fail to incorporate this = fact into=20 our decisions. So, yes, we will adapt to the BMW and the plasma TV, = since we=20 adapt to virtually everything. But Wilson and Gilbert and others have = shown that=20 we seem unable to predict that we will adapt. Thus, when we find the = pleasure=20 derived from a thing diminishing, we move on to the next thing or event = and=20 almost certainly make another error of prediction, and then another, ad=20 infinitum.

As Gilbert points out, this glitch is also significant when it comes = to=20 negative events like losing a job or the death of someone we love, in = response=20 to which we project a permanently inconsolable future. ''The thing I'm = most=20 interested in, that I've spent the most time studying, is our failure to = recognize how powerful psychological defenses are once they're = activated,''=20 Gilbert says. ''We've used the metaphor of the 'psychological immune = system' --=20 it's just a metaphor, but not a bad one for that system of defenses that = helps=20 you feel better when bad things happen. Observers of the human condition = since=20 Aristotle have known that people have these defenses. Freud spent his = life, and=20 his daughter Anna spent her life, worrying about these defenses. What's=20 surprising is that people don't seem to recognize that they = have these=20 defenses, and that these defenses will be triggered by negative = events.'' During=20 the course of my interviews with Gilbert, a close friend of his died. = ''I am=20 like everyone in thinking, I'll never get over this and life will never = be good=20 again,'' he wrote to me in an e-mail message as he planned a trip to = Texas for=20 the funeral. ''But because of my work, there is always a voice in the = back of my=20 head -- a voice that wears a lab coat and has a lot of data tucked under = its arm=20 -- that says, 'Yes, you will, and yes, it will.' And I know that voice = is=20 right.''

Still, the argument that we imperfectly imagine what we want and how = we will=20 cope is nevertheless disorienting. On the one hand, it can cast a shadow = of=20 regret on some life decisions. Why did I decide that working 100 hours a = week to=20 earn more would make me happy? Why did I think retiring to Sun City, = Ariz.,=20 would please me? On the other hand, it can be enlightening. No wonder = this teak=20 patio set hasn't made me as happy as I expected. Even if she dumps me, = I'll be=20 O.K. Either way, predicting how things will feel to us over the long = term is=20 mystifying. A large body of research on well-being seems to suggest that = wealth=20 above middle-class comfort makes little difference to our happiness, for = example, or that having children does nothing to improve well-being -- = even as=20 it drives marital satisfaction dramatically down. We often yearn for a = roomy,=20 isolated home (a thing we easily adapt to), when, in fact, it will = probably=20 compromise our happiness by distancing us from neighbors. (Social = interaction=20 and friendships have been shown to give lasting pleasure.) The big = isolated home=20 is what Loewenstein, 48, himself bought. ''I fell into a trap I never = should=20 have fallen into,'' he told me.

Loewenstein's office is up a narrow stairway in a hidden corner of an = enormous, worn brick building on the edge of the Carnegie-Mellon campus = in=20 Pittsburgh. He and Gilbert make for an interesting contrast. Gilbert is=20 garrulous, theatrical, dazzling in his speech and writing; he fills a = room.=20 Loewenstein is soft-spoken, given to abstraction and lithe in the way of = a=20 hard-core athlete; he seems to float around a room. Both men profess = tremendous=20 admiration for the other, and their different disciplines -- psychology = and=20 economics -- have made their overlapping interests in affective = forecasting more=20 complementary than fraught. While Gilbert's most notable contribution to = affective forecasting is the impact bias, Loewenstein's is something = called the=20 ''empathy gap.''

Here's how it expresses itself. In a recent experiment, Loewenstein = tried to=20 find out how likely people might be to dance alone to Rick James's = ''Super=20 Freak'' in front of a large audience. Many agreed to do so for a certain = amount=20 of money a week in advance, only to renege when the day came to take the = stage.=20 This sounds like a goof, but it gets at the fundamental difference = between how=20 we behave in ''hot'' states (those of anxiety, courage, fear, drug = craving,=20 sexual excitation and the like) and ''cold'' states of rational calm. = This=20 empathy gap in thought and behavior -- we cannot seem to predict how we = will=20 behave in a hot state when we are in a cold state -- affects happiness = in an=20 important but somewhat less consistent way than the impact bias. ''So = much of=20 our lives involves making decisions that have consequences for the = future,''=20 Loewenstein says. ''And if our decision making is influenced by these = transient=20 emotional and psychological states, then we know we're not making = decisions with=20 an eye toward future consequences.'' This may be as simple as an = unfortunate=20 proclamation of love in a moment of lust, Loewenstein explains, or = something=20 darker, like an act of road rage or of suicide.

Among other things, this line of inquiry has led Loewenstein to = collaborate=20 with health experts looking into why people engage in unprotected sex = when they=20 would never agree to do so in moments of cool calculation. Data from = tests in=20 which volunteers are asked how they would behave in various ''heat of = the=20 moment'' situations -- whether they would have sex with a minor, for = instance,=20 or act forcefully with a partner who asks them to stop -- have = consistently=20 shown that different states of arousal can alter answers by astonishing = margins.=20 ''These kinds of states have the ability to change us so profoundly that = we're=20 more different from ourselves in different states than we are from = another=20 person,'' Loewenstein says.

Part of Loewenstein's curiosity about hot and cold states comes from=20 situations in which his emotions have been pitted against his intellect. = When=20 he's not teaching, he treks around the world, making sure to get to = Alaska to=20 hike or kayak at least once a year. A scholar of mountaineering = literature, he=20 once wrote a paper that examined why climbers have a poor memory for = pain and=20 usually ignore turn-back times at great peril. But he has done the same = thing=20 himself many times. He almost died in a whitewater canoeing accident and = vowed=20 afterward that he never wanted to see his runaway canoe again. (A couple = of=20 hours later, he went looking for it.) The same goes for his climbing = pursuits.=20 ''You establish your turn-back time, and then you find yourself still = far from=20 the peak,'' he says. ''So you push on. You haven't brought enough food = or=20 clothes, and then as a result, you're stuck at 13,000 feet, and you have = to just=20 sit there and shiver all night without a sleeping bag or warm clothes. = When the=20 sun comes up, you're half-frozen, and you say, 'Never again.' Then you = get back=20 and immediately start craving getting out again.'' He pushes the point: = ''I have=20 tried to train my emotions.'' But he admits that he may make the same = mistakes=20 on his next trip.

3DWould a=20 world without forecasting errors be a better world? Would a life lived = without=20 forecasting errors be a richer life? Among the academics who study = affective=20 forecasting, there seems little doubt that these sorts of questions will = ultimately jump from the academy to the real world. ''If people do not = know what=20 is going to make them better off or give them pleasure,'' Daniel = Kahneman says,=20 ''then the idea that you can trust people to do what will give them = pleasure=20 becomes questionable.'' To Kahneman, who did some of the first = experiments in=20 the area in the early 1990's, affective forecasting could greatly = influence=20 retirement planning, for example, where mistakes in prediction (how much = we=20 save, how much we spend, how we choose a community we think we'll enjoy) = can=20 prove irreversible. He sees a role for affective forecasting in consumer = spending, where a ''cooling off'' period might remedy buyer's remorse. = Most=20 important, he sees vital applications in health care, especially when it = comes=20 to informed consent. ''We consider people capable of giving informed = consent=20 once they are told of the objective effects of a treatment,'' Kahneman = says.=20 ''But can people anticipate how they and other people will react to a = colostomy=20 or to the removal of their vocal cords? The research on affective = forecasting=20 suggests that people may have little ability to anticipate their = adaptation=20 beyond the early stages.'' Loewenstein, along with his collaborator Dr. = Peter=20 Ubel, has done a great deal of work showing that nonpatients = overestimate the=20 displeasure of living with the loss of a limb, for instance, or = paraplegia. To=20 use affective forecasting to prove that people adapt to serious physical = challenges far better and will be happier than they imagine, Loewenstein = says,=20 could prove invaluable.

There are downsides to making public policy in light of this = research, too.=20 While walking in Pittsburgh one afternoon, Loewenstein tells me that he = doesn't=20 see how anybody could study happiness and not find himself leaning left=20 politically; the data make it all too clear that boosting the living = standards=20 of those already comfortable, such as through lower taxes, does little = to=20 improve their levels of well-being, whereas raising the living standards = of the=20 impoverished makes an enormous difference. Nevertheless, he and Gilbert = (who=20 once declared in an academic paper, ''Windfalls are better than = pratfalls, A's=20 are better than C's, December 25 is better than April 15, and everything = is=20 better than a Republican administration'') seem to lean libertarian in = regard to=20 pushing any kind of prescriptive agenda. ''We're very, very nervous = about=20 overapplying the research,'' Loewenstein says. ''Just because we figure = out that=20 X makes people happy and they're choosing Y, we don't want to impose X = on them.=20 I have a discomfort with paternalism and with using the results coming = out of=20 our field to impose decisions on people.''

Still, Gilbert and Loewenstein can't contain the personal and = philosophical=20 questions raised by their work. After talking with both men, I found it = hard not=20 to wonder about my own predictions at every turn. At times it seemed = like=20 knowing the secret to some parlor trick that was nonetheless very = difficult to=20 pull off -- when I ogled a new car at the Honda dealership as I waited = for a new=20 muffler on my '92 Accord, for instance, or as my daughter's fever spiked = one=20 evening and I imagined something terrible, and then something more = terrible=20 thereafter. With some difficulty, I could observe my mind overshooting = the mark,=20 zooming past accuracy toward the sublime or the tragic. It was tempting = to want=20 to try to think about the future more moderately. But it seemed nearly=20 impossible as well.

To Loewenstein, who is especially attendant to the friction between = his=20 emotional and deliberative processes, a life without forecasting errors = would=20 most likely be a better, happier life. ''If you had a deep understanding = of the=20 impact bias and you acted on it, which is not always that easy to do, = you would=20 tend to invest your resources in the things that would make you happy,'' = he=20 says. This might mean taking more time with friends instead of more time = for=20 making money. He also adds that a better understanding of the empathy = gap --=20 those hot and cold states we all find ourselves in on frequent occasions = --=20 could save people from making regrettable decisions in moments of = courage or=20 craving.

Gilbert seems optimistic about using the work in terms of improving=20 ''institutional judgment'' -- how we spend health care dollars, for = example --=20 but less sanguine about using it to improve our personal judgment. He = admits=20 that he has taken some of his research to heart; for instance, his work = on what=20 he calls the psychological immune system has led him to believe that he = would be=20 able to adapt to even the worst turn of events. In addition, he says = that he now=20 takes more chances in life, a fact corroborated in at least one aspect = by his=20 research partner Tim Wilson, who says that driving with Gilbert in = Boston is a=20 terrifying, white-knuckle experience. ''But I should have learned many = more=20 lessons from my research than I actually have,'' Gilbert admits. ''I'm = getting=20 married in the spring because this woman is going to make me happy = forever, and=20 I know it.'' At this, Gilbert laughs, a sudden, booming laugh that fills = his=20 Cambridge office. He seems to find it funny not because it's untrue, but = because=20 nothing could be more true. This is how he feels. ''I don't think I want = to give=20 up all these motivations,'' he says, ''that belief that there's the good = and=20 there's the bad and that this is a contest to try to get one and avoid = the=20 other. I don't think I want to learn too much from my research in that = sense.''=20

Even so, Gilbert is currently working on a complex experiment in = which he has=20 made affective forecasting errors ''go away.'' In this test, Gilbert's = team asks=20 members of Group A to estimate how they'll feel if they receive negative = personality feedback. The impact bias kicks in, of course, and they = mostly=20 predict they'll feel terrible, when in fact they end up feeling O.K. But = if=20 Gilbert shows Group B that others have gotten the same feedback and felt = O.K.=20 afterward, then its members predict they'll feel O.K. as well. The = impact bias=20 disappears, and the participants in Group B make accurate predictions. =

This is exciting to Gilbert. But at the same time, it's not a = technique he=20 wants to shape into a self-help book, or one that he even imagines could = be=20 practically implemented. ''Hope and fear are enduring features of the = human=20 experience,'' he says, ''and it is unlikely that people are going to = abandon=20 them anytime soon just because some psychologist told them they = should.'' In=20 fact, in his recent writings, he has wondered whether forecasting errors = might=20 somehow serve a larger functional purpose he doesn't yet understand. If = he could=20 wave a wand tomorrow and eliminate all affective-forecasting errors, I = ask,=20 would he? ''The benefits of not making this error would seem to be that = you get=20 a little more happiness,'' he says. ''When choosing between two jobs, = you=20 wouldn't sweat as much because you'd say: 'You know, I'll be happy in = both. I'll=20 adapt to either circumstance pretty well, so there's no use in killing = myself=20 for the next week.' But maybe our caricatures of the future -- these=20 overinflated assessments of how good or bad things will be -- maybe it's = these=20 illusory assessments that keep us moving in one direction over the = other. Maybe=20 we don't want a society of people who shrug and say, 'It won't really = make a=20 difference.'

''Maybe it's important for there to be carrots and sticks in the = world, even=20 if they are illusions,'' he adds. ''They keep us moving towards carrots = and away=20 from sticks.''

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