Working Papers:

"Capital Market Conditions and the Pricing of Private Equity Sales," June 2007 (with M. Huson and P. Malatesta).

Abstract: This study reports evidence that the overall level of private placement activity, the value created by private placements, and the division of this value between new and existing investors are all influenced by general capital market conditions as well as by firm and issue characteristics. We find that private placements are more likely to occur following periods of relatively high stock market returns, high levels of initial public offer underpricing and frequency, and high bond yields. General market conditions are also important determinants of pricing in private sales of equity. Private placement offer prices are not efficient with respect to public information as measured discounts and returns to original investors are related to capital market conditions. Discounts reflect the relative bargaining power of issuing firms and investors as well as compensation for the costs of monitoring or information acquisition. (Download)

Published and Forthcoming Articles:

Gillan, S. L., Hartzell, J. C., and R. Parrino. “Explicit vs. Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO Employment Agreements.” July 2008. Forthcoming in Journal of Finance.

Borokhovich, K., Brunarski, K., Harman, Y., and Parrino R. "Variation in the Monitoring Incentives of Outside Blockholders." Journal of Law and Economics., Vol. 49 (2006), 651-680.

Ju, N., Poteshman, A., Parrino, R., and Weisbach M. "Horses and Rabbits? Optimal Dynamic Capital Structure from Shareholder and Manager Perspectives." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis., Vol. 40 (2005), 259-281.

Poteshman, A., Parrino, R., and Weisbach M. "Measuring Investment Distortions when Risk-Averse Managers Decide Whether to Undertake Risky Projects." Financial Management, Vol. 34 (Spring 2005), 21-60.

Huson, M., Malatesta, P., and Parrino R. "Managerial Succession and Firm Performance." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 74 (2004), 237-275.

Parrino, R., Sias, R., and Starks, L. "Voting With Their Feet: Institutional Ownership Changes Around Forced CEO Turnover." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 68 (2003), 3-46 (lead article).

Hadlock, C, Lee, S., and Parrino, R. “CEO Careers in Regulated Environments: Evidence for Gas and Electric Utilities." Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 45 (2002), 535-563.

Huson, M., Parrino, R., and Starks, L. “Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long Term Perspective.” Journal of Finance, Vol. 56 (2001), 2265-2297.

Parrino, R. and Weisbach, M. "Measuring Investment Distortions Arising from Stockholder-Bondholder Conflicts." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 53 (1999), 3-42. (lead article)

Byrd, J., Parrino, R., and Pritsch, G. "Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value." Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 54 (May/June 1998), 14-30. (lead article)

Parrino, R. “CEO Turnover and Outside Succession: A Cross-Sectional Analysis.” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 46 (1997), 165-197.

Borokhovich, K., Brunarski, K., and Parrino R. “CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments.” Journal of Finance, Vol. 52 (1997), 1495-1517.

Parrino, R. “Spin-offs and Wealth Transfers: The Marriott Case.” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 43 (1997), 241-274.

Borokhovich, K., Parrino, R., and Trapani, T. “Outside Directors and CEO Selection.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 31 (1996), 337-355.

Martin, J. and Parrino, R. “Director Responsibility and Consulting Relationships.” Directors and Boards, Vol. 20 (Summer 1996), 32-35. (cover article)

Vandell, R. and Parrino, R. “A Purposeful Stride Down Wall Street.” The Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 12 (1986), 31-39.