Centers | CREC

IIAR Project

The IIAR Project is building econometric models for economic incentives for Internet mail providers to improve their dealings with spam and botnets. This work employs game theoretic models and other formal mathematical models, together with statistical analysis and extensive empirical analysis of the Internet primarily based on anti-spam blocklists. One of the results of the project is a prototype reputation system for mail providers and and for blocklists.

We've launched the public, displaying rankings by number of spam messages of Autonomous Systems (groups of IP addresses) of medical and of all organizations in the United States and internationally. The website encourages these organizations to improve their security, thereby prohibiting the unethical use of their servers to generate spam.

The IIAR Project is funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation, NSF Award #0831338, CT-ISG: Collaborative Research: Incentives, Insurance and Audited Reputation: An Economic Approach to Controlling Spam.

Project Staff

John Quarterman, project manager

Yanzhen Chen
Ying-Yu Chen
Shu He
Gene Moo Lee
Shun-Yang Lee
Liangfei Qiu
Qian Tang

Acknowledgements and Disclaimer

National Science Foundation

This material is based upon work supported by the NSF under Grant No. 0831338.

Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

Data Sources

We also gratefully acknowledge custom data from CBL, PSBL, Fletcher Mattox and the University of Texas Computer Science Department, Quarterman Creations, and especially Team Cymru. None of them are responsible for anything we do, either.


Page last updated: 10/14/2013